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tNTRODUCTION 
It is rather interesting to examine what a modern philos-
opher says about God who has explicit~y rejected st. Thomas's 
God and has put forth a substitute which according to one 
critic is more Godlike than that of St. Thomas. l In examin-
.. 
ing st. Thomas's explanation of God it is interesting to 
notice that he explains his position in such a way as to meet 
the objections brought out by Whitehead against his own view 
and gives very definite reasons for excluding those concepts 
which Whitehead wishes to use as descriptive of his own God. 
The starting point of this thesis was a statement made by 
Hartshorne. In order to understand why he made it, it was 
necessary to examine his analysis of St. Thomas's God, and 
next his analysis of Whitehead's God in order to see why he 
preferred the God of Whitehead to the God of St. Thomas. 
..... 
Hartshorne's account of Whitehead's God is adequate for 
the most part, and therefore instead of describing Whitehead's 
God by direct quotations from Whitehead himself I have quoted 
Hartshorne's summary of Whitehead's descriptions with refer-
ences to the relevant passages in Whitehead. However, at 
times I brought in direct quotations from Whitehead where they 
seemed important, and in particular I quoted Whitehead directly 
1 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," ~ Philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 523. 
ii 
in a few points which Hartshorne did not sufficiently ~mpha­
size. The same applie~ to the account which Hartshorne gives 
of st. Thomas's God. This is simply a restatement of White-
head's own position on that point and therefore any direct 
quotations from Whitehead as regards the God of st. Thomas 
are me~ely for the sake of emphasis. 
On examining st. Thomas's own concept of God in the light 
.. 
of Hartshorne's difficulties and in contrast with the sub-
stitute account of God which Whitehead proposes, I was very 
much interested to observe that in St. Thomas himself one 
could find: (a) a discussion of the very difficulties which 
Whitehead raises against St. Thomas's God and (b) explicit 
reasons for rejecting the component elements of the substitute 
concept which Whitehead offers. 
Although I have reason to believe that this thesis is 
It 
acceptable in its present form, if time permitted I should 
prefer for the purpose of publication to recast it along the 
following lines: first, to present point by point Whitehead's 
comments on st. Thomas's God together with St. Thomas's 
anticipations of those comments; and second, to present in 
turn the various elements of Whitehead's concept of God in 
contrast to the reasons which St. Thomas puts forward for re-
jecting those same elements. 
It is very difficult to give an analysis of Whitehead's 
positive doctrines because of his esoteric terminology. He 
iii 
.' 
has created an entirely new philosophic vocabulary and has 
the habit of using familiar words in novel senses. To ferret 
out the meaning he attaches to words is a study in itself. 
PART I .' 
CHAPTER I 
a~TSHORNE'S ANALYSIS OF ST. THOMASiS CONCEPT 
In the first part of this chapter Professor Hartshorne's 
"7 
statement of Whitehead's views on St. Thomas are presented. A 
few points omitted by Hartshorne but relevant to our problem 
are added towards the close of the chapter by the writer. 
st. Thomas's God, as Whitehead conceives Him, is "sheer 
absolute perfection."l He is defined as completeness or 
maximality of value, such that nothing conceivably could be 
u2 
added to it. He is the flpure actuality," which contains 
no potency whatsoever. He is the IIcause of all," "which is 
:l,n no aspect of its being the effect of any.,,3 He is the 
"changeless," which is in no aspect changingj4 the "static," 
vhich is in no aspect dynamicj5 the independent, which is in .~ 
no aspect dependent,6 the one which is in no aspect many. In 
brief, He is the all-perfect, infinite, immutable, transcendent, 
self-subsistent, "static Absolute." 
As we shall see when examining St. Thomas's God, this 
description is correct except in one point. 7 We must now 
1 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," in The Philos-
~ of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 518. See also A:-1f~ White-
head, Modes of Thought, pp. 92-95. 
; Hartshorne, .0'j)'7 cit., p. 516. 
~ Ibid. ---
~ Whitehead, Modes Jf Thought, p. 112 6 Ibid., p. Ill. --
~ A. N • Whitehead, Religion .1!L-~ Making, p .107 • 
I' See below, pp. 17-18. 
2 
examine the analysis Professor Whitehead makes, of each of 
• 
these attributes and his reasons for rejecting them. 
All of the attributes of the traditional God, it is White-
headls conviction, are arrived at by abstraction, a process 
which is "nothing else than the omission of part of the truth,:8 
The notion of complete or maximum perfection, for example, can-
not be conceived except by abstracting from, or omitting from 
consideration "all mutual exclusivenes'S among values," and 
also "every aspect of process." 9 For it is evident that per-
fections of diverse types are discordant. The perfection of 
a Gothic Cathedral, for example, is not the perfection of a 
nightingale. Since, then, "there are possibilities of harmony 
which produce evil in joint realization, or are incapable of 
such conjunction," 10 there can be no "totality which is ,the 
11 harmony of all perfections. tf It is also evident that 
God and the whole are constantly evolving, and perfections 
which are incompatible in one set of circumstances may occur 
together in a later stage of process.12 Hence at no epoch 
in the creative advance ma,y God be It absolute perfection." 
Another reason advanced by Whitehead for rejecting the attri-
butes of infinite perfection in God is that finite good could 
not exist if there were any being which is the "infinitude of 
8 Modes of Thought, p. 189. 
It 
9 Hartshorne, .2£. ill. p. 516. 
10 Ibid., p. 520. 
11 A:'"rf. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 330. For a critical 
analysis of this objection see below pP. 14-16. 
12 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 75. For a critical analysis 
of this objection, see below pp. 34-39. 
3 
all perfection." For to'affirm the existence of an intin1te 
good external to and distinct from the world, and at the same 
time, to affirm the existence of finite good, appears to him to 
be a patent contradiction. 13 It is conceived by abstract-
ing from consideration the interrelatedness of all things, 'in-
cluding God. 
A similar abstractedness, or one-sidedness of view, is 
a. 
involved in the Thomistic concept of God as the "immutable" 
being and as flpure actuality." Immutability omits activity. 
It is the extreme notion of being as static in opposition to 
being as dynamic. Dynamic is the qualification" which has 
been most sadly lacking in the tradition." 14 "Pure actuality" 
is one-sided for it omits potentiality. That it cannot be 
ascribed to God is clear from the consideration that poten-
tiality could not exist if there were any being who was "pure 
15 
actuality.tr Also, since God has not produced all the ef-
fects He could produce, He contains potentiality. 16 
The concept of God as wholly independent of the world, as 
a "cause of all," "which is in no aspect of its being the 
effect of any,fI is another idea arrived at by abstraction, or 
.. 
13 Hartshorne, £2. cit., p. 534. St.Thomas's apticipation 
of this objection-is quoted below p.16. His reply is given 
below p.17. 
14 Ibid., St.Thomas's anticipation of this objection is quoted 
b'elow pp •. 17-18. 
15 Ibid. p. 526. See Below p. 18 for our answer to this ob-jection. 
16 ~., p. 517. For a critical analysis of this objection 
see below pp. 18-19. 
4 
17 
omitting part of the truth. Every actual entity is both 
.' 
cause and effect. Further, there can be no cause without 
an effect. Again, "no God is conceivable who would not depend 
for part of his value on the actions of creatures. fI Also, "the 
doctrine of radical and complete independence of God from the 
world represents an extreme position," the opposite of which 
is the doctrine of "his complete identity with it.fI 18 But 
... 
extreme positions never represent the truth. "There is no 
entity, not even God's, which requires nothing but itself in 
order to exist." 19 
Such are Whitehead's reasons for rejecting the Thomistic 
conception of God, as correctly restated by Hartshorne; and 
such, apparently, are Hartshorne's own reasons for rejecting 
it. A few additional objections which further elucidate White-
head's position, but which are not explicitly mentioned by 
.... 
Hartshorne follow. 
Whitehead asserts that all of the attributes of the Thomis-
tic God represent mere abstractions, similar to the idea,s in 
Plato's realm of forms. Thus Whitehead affirms: 
17 
18 
19 
The most simple doctrine about types of 
being is that some extreme type exists 
independently of the rest of things. For 
example, Greek philosophers, and in particu-
lar, Plato, seem to have held this doctrine 
Ibid., p. 517. See below pp.19-21 for st. Thomas's antici-
pation of this objection. 
Ibid., p. 524. 
Whitehead, Religion 19 the Making, p. 107. For a critical 
analysis of this objection see below pp.21-27. 
in respect of qualitative abstractions, 
such as number, geometrical relations, .' 
moral characteristics, and the qualitative 
disclosures of the higher sense perceptions • 
• • • Later, it transformed the Hebraic 
elements in Christian theology. 
• • • This notion of the value of timeless 
forms leads to rhetorical question-begging 
phrases, such as 'self-s~staining,' 'com- 20 
pletely real} 'perfection. ' 
5 
The notions ,of immutability and self-subsistence, in White-
head's view, were derived from· the Gr~k notion of mathematical 
forms. "Ee.ch number, each ratio, each geometric form exhibited 
a static attainment ••.• These ideal forms are motionless •••• 
and self-sufficient." Accordingly, ultimate reality was con-
ceived in the guise of a "static Absolute." And "the static 
Absolute has been passed over to philosophic theology, as a 
primary presupposition." 21 Thomists, then)influenced by 
the Greeks, have set up in the place of the concrete God, a 
false abstraction. In Whitehead's words, they have fallen into 
the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" - "the error of mis-
taking the abstract for the concrete." 22 
Another reason given by Whitehead for rejecting the tradi-
tional notion of God is that, in his view, it is based on an 
erroneous science and an erroneous cosmology. He asserts: 
The phrase, "Prime Mover', warns us that 
Aristotle's thought was enmeshed in the 
20 Modes of Thought, pp. 92-94. 
21 Ibid. ,~p. 111. 
22 A. N. Whitehead, Science.~~ t!odern World, pp. 74-75. 
For a critical analysis of this objection see below 
pp. 27-29. 
details of an erroneous physics and an , 
erroneous cosmology • • • • Today we repudiate 
the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian 
cosmology •••• In the place of Aristotle's 
God as Prime Mover,' we reggire God as the 
Principle of Concretion. 23 
The (in Whitehead's viewlerroneous theory of cosmology which 
.;, 
regards the laws of nature as imposed, is, according to him, 
the basis of the traditional concept of God as First Cause. 
[The theory which conceives \he laws 
directing the universe as imposed] 
requires a transcendent God as imposer • • • 
God made his appearance in religion under . 
the frigid title of First Cause, and was 
appropria~~lY worshipped in white-washed 
churches. 
An erroneous theory of science, combined with Christian 
6 
theology, combined with ancient despotism, produced the classi-
cal concept of God, according to Whitehead. 
The notion of God as 'unmoved mover' is 
derived from Aristotle • • •• The notion 
of God as 'eminently real' is a favorite 
doctrine of Christian theology. The combina-
tion of the two into the doctrine of an abo-
riginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, 
at whose fiat the world came into being, and 
whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy 
which has infused tragedy into the histories 
of Christianity and of Mohametanism • • • ~he 
Church gave unto God the attributes which 
belonged exclusively to Caes8,r. 25 
It is Whitehead's opinion that one must change his notion 
of God with every important new scientific advance and every 
23 1.!?l:.£., p. 250. 
24 Adventures of Ideas, p. 154# 
-.---25 Ibid. 
7 
notably new form of government. nScience suggests a c~~mology; 
8nd whatever suggests a cosmology suggests a religion. 1f 26 
tiThe great point to be kept in mind is that normally an ad-
vance in science will show that statements of v8,rious relig-
ious beliefs require some sort of mod~fication.tI 27 And relig-
ion should learn to "change face in the same spirit as does 
science." 28 "In the origin of civilized religion, Gods are 
.. 
like Dictators," we are told. tlWhen the religious thought 
of the ancient world from Mesopotamia to Palestine and from 
Palestine to Egypt, required terms to express that ultimate 
unity of direction in the universe •••• they could find no 
better way to express themselves th8,n by borrowing the cha,rac-
teristics of the touchy, vain, imperious tyrants who ruled the 
empires of the world." 29 But "the old phraseology is at 
variance with the psychology of modern civilizations. tI 30 
Accordingly, it is Whitehead's belief, that a new ide~l of God 
founded upon the new physics and upon the new democracies must 
be given to twentieth-century mankind. His substitute for 
the Thomistic God will now be considered. 
26 Religion.ULthe Making, p. 141. 
27 Science .~ .. the _ Modern .. World, p. 257. 
28 Ibid., p. 270. 
29 Modes_~ Thought, p. 68. 
30 Science and the Modern World, p. 274 • 
. _-_.....o,..;;....-,.;;.;;;...;;.;. ___ ..-..;;;;~ 
·' CHAPTER II 
HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS OF WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT 
Whitehead I s God, as Professor H8,rtshorne very adequately 
represents him, is the supreme exempliJ;ication of "ultimate con-
traries. tll He is both the permanent and the flux, the temporal 
and the eternal, the "supreme cause" and the IIsupreme totality 
.. 
of effects," the unity and the complexity, the activity and the 
paSSivity, the being and the becoming, yes,he is even the joy 
and the suffering, the good and the evil, and the creator and the 
creature, though not in the same aspects of his being. 2 
There are two natures in Whitehead's God, the Primordial 
and the Consequent. In his Primordial Nature, God is " static,tI 
"eternal, f! ucomplete, perfect, infinite, II yet he is "unconscious,"' 
and "deficient in actuality.fJ 3 The apparent inconsistency of 
. .. 
this assertion is, as Dr. Hartshorne assures us, only apparent, 
~or the completeness, perfection, and infinity ascribed to God 
pelong only to "the dimension of 'mentality', or abstract realize:-
[IJion of value. II "The unlimited conceptual reali~ation of the' 
~.bs'olute wealth of potentiality, as such realization of the poten 
uial, is superior to any conceivable conceptual realization or 
3.wareness of potency which could be distinguished from God's." 
n the IIconcrete dimension of value ll God even in his Primordial 
... OQ. cit., p. 523. 
2 Ibid. 
3 A. N. Whitehead, Process ~ Reality, pp. 521, 523 ff. 
See also Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 525. 
9 
Nature, must not be understood to be infinite a,nd perfect. 4 
.' God in his Consequent Nature, or concrete being, is conscious 
and finite. It is in this aspect that He is also "fluent," 
temporal, passive, a,nd dependent upon creatures. 5 
God and the world are not separat.ed, for God is the "all 
inclusive actual entity." His being and the being of creatures 
are so fused that any creature "if and when it exists, must be 
... fully contained in God, so that the two could not be distin-
guished except as the other failed to contain some value that was 
contained in God.,,6 The only difference, then, which separates 
God from creatures is one of value. There is no ontological 
separateness of one from the other. 7 
This notion of God's relation to the world, according to 
Professor Whitehead avoids two extremes: first, the extreme 
doctrine of "radical and complete independence of God from the 
world,lI which is the position of traditional theism, and which 
.... 
according to Whitehead is best exemplified in the rigid mono-
theism of the old Testament;8 and secondly, the opposite extreme 
of Godls complete identity with the world, as equiva,lent to Pan-
theism. 
God, therefore, is not purely transcendent, nor is He pure-
ly irn.manent. He is neither IImere creator," nor "mere total of 
creatures." The phrase which properly expresses what He is, is: 
4 Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 526 (Italics not in the original). 
5 For a critical analysis of this position see below pp.3l-32. 
6 Ibid., p. 525. 
7 For a critical analysis of this position see below pp.32-34. 
8 Religion,la.~Making, p. 68. 
10 
the creator-with-the-creatures." 9 Or, since reality, accord-
.' ing to Professor Whitehead is to be viewed 8,S an organic unity, 
like a person, we may conceive God as "the personality of the 
cosmiC body," 10 "the harmony of epochR.l occasions, If or orga,nic 
with the universe. ll God becomes an abstraction if separated 
.... 
from the Universe, just [>,s the cells or molecules of a body 
hBve no independent subsistence outside of the body. 
God in one aspect of His being i~ evolving with the pro-
gressing world. He is "enriched by the world," 12 e,nd He 
(Ipasses be.ck to the world to sha.re this enhancement !13 As 
Whi tehe2.d a,sserts: 
The notion of a supreme being must apply 
to an actuality in process of composition, 
an actuality not confined to the data of 
any special epoch in the historic field. 
Its actuality is founded on the infinitude 
of its conceptual appetition, and its form 
of process is derived from the fusion of 
this appetition with the data received from 14 
the world-process. 
And elsewhere: 
It is as true to say that God creates the 
World, as that the World creates God. 15 
Admittedly, "the cause is never 'equ8,1 to the effect,' the lat-
ter always being the richer; the former, seen retrospectively 
9 Ibid., p. 517. See also Adventures of Ideas, pp. 154-166. 
10 Ibid., p. 550 
11 :AC:lVentures of Idee s, p. 264. ' For St. Thomas's reEtSOns for 
rejecting such a position, see below p. 34. 
12 Charles Hartshorne, "Is Whitehea,d' s God the God of Religion," 
in Ethics, Vol. LIII, No.3 (April 1943) p. 226. 
13 Ibid. 
Ih MO'des of Thought, p. 128. 
15 .ProcesS-and Reality, p. p. 528. For St. Thomas's reasons for 
rejecting such a pOSition, see below pp. 34-37. 
being a reduction of the latter to an abstract or incomplete 
version of itself.,,16 Moreover, "Neither God nor the World 
reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of... the 
creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the 
worldJis the instrument of novelty for;.the other." 17 
Such are the more important aspects of Whitehead's God, 
as Professor He,rtshorne describes them, and as an examination 
.. 
of the relevant pe,s sage s in Whitehead's works referred to by 
Hartshorne prove them to be. We now pa.ss to Hartshorne's de-
fense of these attributes as more properly descriptive of the 
supreme being than ~hose ascribed to God by St. Thomas. 
16 Hartshorne, ££. cit., p. 544. 
17 Whitehead, Process.~,Reality, p. 529. 
11 
.' 
CHAPTER III 
HARTSHORNE'S COMPARISON OF THE TWO CONCEPTS AND 
HIS REASONS FOR HIS CONCLUSION 
.;, 
We have seen why Professor Hartshorne rejects the Thomis-
tic conception of God and what he accepts as a substitute for 
it. It now remains to be, seen why he ~hinks this new notion 
is better. 
Whitehead's concept, it is Hartshorne IS conviction, repre-
sents a real, actually existing entity, -whereas the idea of 
God given us by St. Thomas is an "abstract extreme •••• involv-
ing the fallacy of misplaced concretness." 1 For: 
Nothing-concrete or actual is merely one or 
merely ~any, or a mere cause which is in no 
way incomplete or subject to addition, or an 
activity which is in no way passive. 2 
Also, Whitehead's notion of God as "literally immanent" 
in creatures, who "appropriates other individualities into him-
self," and who "requires his union with the world,1f 3 is better 
than the Thomistic notion of God as transcendent, which denies 
the social nature of God and absolutely denies that God is love~ 
The idea of a God who is, in some aspect of his being, "in 
process" and -who is capable of "self enrichment" is more rationa 
than the conception of an all-perfect God who is changeless. For 
1 QQ. Cit., p. 521. 
2 Ibid., p. 522. 
3 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas,p. 215. 
4 Hartshorne,.£E. cit., -To 528. 
13 
to conceive the absolutely perfect it is necessary to ~stract 
from, or omit from consideration, aspects essential to a.ny con-
crete entity, the temporal character of value, • . . as well 
as all mutual exclusiveness among values, • • • and all rela-
tionship to beings whose value is not terfect." 5 The content 
of the concept of perfection, then, varies with the cosmic ad-
vance, and its concrete realization is limited by the setting 
• proyided by its cosmic epoch. 
5. Ibid., p. 516. 
PART II 
CHAPTER I 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS 
OF ST. THOMAS'S CO~CEPT 
~ 
.' 
In Hartshorne's criticism of traditional theism all of 
the attributes ascribed to God by St. Thomas are made to appear 
.. 
as "abstract or one-sided" ideas,l conceived by omitting from 
consideration "one pole of a categorical contrast," 2 and 
representative, consequently, of only part-truths. The two at-
tributes of "sheer absolute perfection and sheer c8,usality or 
actuality" are singled out as especially exemplificative of this 
error. 3 
The notion of infinite perfection is held to be incapable 
of concrete realization on the ground that perfections are 
diverse and obviously mutually repugnant. IIPossibilities are in 
part mutually incompatible, they are not a,lways compos sible , and 
as Whitehead says, theologians have been strangely reluctant to 
face the implications of this truth." 4 
But is St. Thomas committed to the view that God is tithe 
infinitude of all perfections," in the sense that in Him oppositE 
perfections coexist? On the contrary, he is careful to ma,ke 
clear that he does not teach any such absurdity. He himself pro-
poses this very objection before proceeding to show in yhatway 
1 Q£. cit. p. 517. 
2 ~. p. 516. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 526. 
15 
all the perfeytions of crea,tures are contained in God. Thus, 
he asserts: .' 
Opposites cannot coexist. Now perfections 
of things are opposed to each other, for 
each thing is perfected by its specific dif-
ference. But the differences by which genera 
are divided, and species constituted, e .. re 
opposed to each other. Th~efore, because 
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, 
it seems that the perfections of all things 5 
are not in God. 
However, God is spoken of as universal~y perfect, St. Thomas ex-
plains, "bec8llse 
He lacks not • • • any excellence that may 
be found in any genus. This may be seen 
from two considerations. First, because what-
ever perfection exists in an effect must be 
found in the effective cause; either in the 
same formality, if it is an univocal agent, as 
when man produces man; or in a more eminent 
degree, if it is an equivocal agent • 
• • • NOW, it is plain that the effect pre-
exists virtually in the efficient cause; and 
though to exist in the potentiality of a 
ma~erial cause is to exist in a more imper-
fect way, since matter as such is imperfect, 
and an agent as such is perfect, still to pre-
exist virtually in the efficient cause is ,to 
pre-exist, not in a more imperfect, but in a 
more perfect, way. Since, therefore, God is 
the first effective cause of things, the per-
fections of all things must pre-exist in God 6 
in a more eminent ,way. 
St. Thomas, then, in affirming that all the perfections of 
creatures are contained in God does not thereby assert that oppo-
sites coexist in the s~e subject, -this could not be done 
~ithout palpable contradiction, -- but that God, as cause, pos-
sesses at least equivalently all the perfections of His effects. 
5 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I q.4 .. e..'2. obj.2. 
6 Ibid., Resp. 
16 
Certain rules of prediaation are given us by the Angelic 
.' Doctor which assist us in understanding how the various perfec-
tions of created things are to be ascribed to God. Thus, he 
observes, some perfections of their very nature imply imperfec-
tion. Among these are all perfections~which imply corporeal 
conditions, such as physical beauty, sight, hearing, and exten-
sion. St. Thomas a.sserts that these are to be predicated of 
God only metaphorically. Other perfections, such ~s goodness, 
life, intelligence and the like, on the contrary, do not of thenr' 
selves involve imperfection, and so are predicated of God liter-
ally. However, since these latter perfections are found in 
creatures only in a limited and finite manner, they are not at-
tributed to God according to the mode in which the creatures 
possess them, but in a. supereminent way. 7 By observing St. 
Thomas's rules of predication, then, it is possible to attribute 
to God infinite perfection without contradiction. 
We have now to examine the objection that finite perfection 
could not exist if there were any being which was infinite per-
fection. This objection, like the preceding, must not be sup-
posed to be new. St. Thomas was fully aware of it. His state-
ment of it runs: 
• • • that which is a thing in such a way as not 
to be another thing, is finite according to sub-
stance. But God is this and not another; for He 
is not a stone or wood. Therefore, God is not 
infinite in substance. 8 
This difficulty is based on the fallacy of regarding the 
7 Ibid. I q. 13 a 3 ad 1; I q. 13 a 6. 
8 'I'6'IQ:. I q. 7 a 1 obj. 3. 
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term 'being' as univocal. Professor Hartshorne assumes that 
.' 
God and man are beings in the same sense. Yet the word 'being' 
is analogous even in its reference to created things. Thus its 
meaning is not identical when it is applied to substance and to 
accident, or to a thinker 'and his tho~ht. Consequently, the 
existence of an infinite Being who is the fullness of all real-
ity, in no way precludes the existence of finite beings. In 
other words, God plus creatures does ntt constitute more being; 
they simply cannot be added, for creatures are beings in an in-
ferior order. After creation, there are more beings, but 
there is no more being in the world. A feeble comparison may be 
made regarding knowledge which is first possessed only by a 
teacher and later by all his pupils. After the instruction 
there would be more people who would know, but there would be no 
more knowledge. Or to use St. Thomas's comparison: 
The created good is related to the uncreated 
good as a pOint to a line, since there is no 
proportion between one and the other; whence 
as a point added to a line does not make it 
greater, so neither does a created good ••• 
added to the uncreated good make it greater. 9 
This brings us to the objection that an immutable God is 
"static, inactive, or dead." This is a false equation. St.Thomas 
never identified an immutable God with a static God. On the con-
tra.ry, he proves that the immobility to be ascribed to an all-
perfect God is not the immutability of inertness or lifelessness, 
but the immutability of supreme activity. Indeed, anticipating 
9 In ill Sent. d. 1 q. 2 a. 3 ad 1. 
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this very objection he asserts: 
.' It seems that life is not properly attributed 
to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as 
they move themselves. • • • But movement does 
not belong to God. Neither, therefore, does life. 9 
He then points out that activity is not identical with movement 
or change, but that the more perfect tte activity the less is 
the movement. Thus immanent activity involves less change than 
transitive activity. Further, the hi~hest kind of immanent 
activity is intellection, and this operation in God involves no 
movement. Consequently, God though immutable is supremely ac-
tive and living. 
Professor Hartshorne's difficulties regarding "sheer causal-
ity or actuality" must now be examined. His rejection of the 
conception of God as Itpure actualityfl on the ground that, "poten-
10 tiality ••• could be nothing, were there a complete actuallty," 
is the result of his simple and univocal conception of the not~IJ 
of being. As we have already shown, this notion is analogous 
and consequently, the existence of real potentiality in the order 
of created things does not preclude the existence in a divine 
mode of a Being, Who is Pure Act. 
But, it is urged, potentiality must exist even in the divine 
mode of being, since God has not produced all of the effects He 
could produce. St. Thomas offers a full solution of this diffi-
11 
culty in his Contra Gentiles, which we venture to restate 
9 Summa Theologica, I q. 18 a. 3 obj. 1. 
10 Ope Cit., p. 526. 
11 Contra Gentiles,II c.XXXIII and XXXV; also de' Pot.,q.3 a 17. 
--
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briefly. "It is impossible for a new action to be in the agent, 
4' 
unless the latter be in some way moved, at least from inaction 
to action." But newness of ef'fect does not necessarily prove 
newness of action, nor consequently change in the agent. For in 
the case of an agent whose will is ab~olutely efficacious for 
producing its effect, the appearance of the latter need not 
necessarily coincide in time with the act of willing it. But 
the will can appoint the time a.s well 1s other conditions of the 
thing. ,Therefore an effect may follow anew from an agent's for-
mer will, without any new action on his part. In God, then, the~ 
is no transition from potency to act because effects emerge in 
time. He has willed from all eternity the moment in time at 
which they should appear. 
Let us now pass to the objections directed against the 
notion of God as transcendent. "An agent which acts, but is not 
12 
acted upon, II a God who is t cause of all,' but effect of none 
is regarded by Professor Hartshorne as an absurdity. In his 
metaphysics, creatures "furnish parts of" God. 13 But as 
St.Thomas teaches: 
• • • God is outside the order of the whole 
creation, nor does any relation to the 
creature arise from His nature; for He does 
not produce the creature by necessity of His 
nature, but by His intellect and will • • • • 
Therefore there is no real relation in God 
to the creature, whereas in creatures there 
is a real relation to God • • • because their 
very nature entails dependence on God. 1----------------
12 ~. £!!., p. 516. 
13 Ibid., p. 541. 
14 ~a Theologica I q.28 a.1 ad 3. 
14 
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,That the condition of God as Creator does not .involve in 
Him a relation to, and consequently dependence upon the created 
universe, is shown by St. Thomas15 from the following consid-
erations. Relations are either real or conceptual in three 
ways, since every relation has' two ext.remes. They are real in 
.... 
both'extremes "When a habitude exists between two things ac-
cording to some reality which belongs to both," as hp',ppens in 
relations of quantity, such s,s between·double and hs,lf, large 
and small, and the like. They are conceptual in both extremes 
when the "habitude can only be between things in the apprehen-
si,on of reason. tI Thus the relation existing between an idea 
and a word signifying it, is a conceptual relation, since there 
is no objective connection between the idea and the. word, but 
only a connection established by the mind. 
Finally, a relation may be real in one extreme and concep-
tual in the other. This happens whenever. the two extremes are ..... 
not of the same order; as objects in nature and concepts repre-
senting them belong to the real and the conceptual orders 
respecti vely. Between s, concept and the object which it repre-
sents there is a real relation on the side of the concept, for 
the latter could not have originated without the former. But 
the object is in no sense really dependent upon the concept. 
It is not affected in any way by ideas representing it. (A 
stone does not grow larger because many think of it.) There is 
merely a conceptual or mental relation between it and a concept 
15 Ibid., I q. 13 a.7. 
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representing it. The relation is the same as regards God and 
.' the universe. As St. Thomas concludes: 
Since therefore God is outside the whole 
order of creation, and all creatures are 
ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is 
manifest that creatures are really related 
to God Himse·lf; whereas in God there is no 
real relation to creatures, but a relation 
only in idea, inasmuch as creatures a,re 
ref'erred to Him. 
God, then"is necessary to the world, but, and here we 
.. 
must disagree with Professor Hartshorne, the world is not 
necess8,ry to God. The ef'fect cannot exist without its cause, 
but the converse is not true. As st. Thoma.s puts it: 
If one thing is the cause of another 
thing, the cause can exist without the 
thing caused, but not vice versa. 17 
We come now to the objection that the Thomistic notion 
of complete transcendence represents a,n extreme, the opposite 
of which is the notion of complete identity between God and 
the world. We must note, first of all, that the traditional .... 
idea of transcendent God is vastly different from White-
head's notion of it, which Hartshorne apparently adopts. 
Whitehead equates a transcendent God with a "touchy, vain, 
imperious tyrant" of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian variety. 
He is "frigid," unconcerned as to the workings of the world 
or to the suf'ferings of man. Moreover, Whitehead informs us: 
The concept of him was a sublimation from 
its barba,ric origin. He stood in the same 
rela,tion to the whole World as early 
Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to 
their subject popUlations. 18 
--=-16,......-=I::":"b~i~d-. -
17 De Ente et Essentia, c. 4. 
18 Adventures of Ideas,p. 216. 
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Whitehead frequently speaks of the notions of "complete real-
i ty, II "absolute being," tf self- sustaining reality, If ant the 
like, as haunting human imagination. 20 We do not wonder. For 
the myth to ,whom Whitehead ascribes these attributes is but 
the ghost of the living God. It is the god of the Deists, --
whom to most Christians are but Atheists in disguise, - not 
the Supreme Being of the traditional theists. 
The God of Thomistic philosophy,. though "above all things 
by the excellence of His nature," is not on that account dis-
tant from 8.nd unconcerned about them. 2l On the contrary, He 
is very near, for He "is in all things, and innermostly," 
"not, indeed as part of their essence, nor as an accident, 
but as e,n agent is present to th9.t upon which it works." 22 
So intimately is the world related to God that were He to 
withdraw His sustaining influence from it for one moment, it 
would relapse into nothingness, just as the light which is 
caused.in,the air by the sun disappears at once when the sun 
ceases to enlighten it. 23 
To those who find it difficult to conceive why the world 
once created could not continue in being without God, just as 
a house once constructed continues without the builder, St. 
Thomas offers the following considerations: 
Every agent depends upon its cause, so far as 
it is its cause. But we must observe that an 
20 Cf. Modes of Thought, p. 94. 
21 Summa .Theologica, I q. 8 a. 1. 
22 ~. 
23 Ibid., I q. 104, a. 1. 
agent m8,y be the cause of the becoming of 
its effect, but not directly of its being., 
This may be seen both in artificirl 2nd i; 
natural things: for the briilder causes the 
house in its becoming, but he is not the 
direct c-ause of it s being. 
23 
24 
The being of the house, St. Thomp.s explains, depends UDon the 
building materials, - the "cement, sioone, gnd WOOd," -just 
as its becoming depends upon the e,ction of the builder. And 
just as the becoming of an effect ceases upon the cessation 
.. 
of the operat'ion of the agent which is the cause of its becom-
ing; so likewise, the being of a thing 81so cea,ses upon the 
cessation of the a,ction of the agent which is the cause of 
its being. Consequently, if all of the cosmic influences 
necessary for the conservation of the house were to wi thdra,w 
their causality, the structure would at once disappear. 
The truth that no being continues in existence ivithout 
the present actu2,1 existence of its cause in being is more 
evident in the ca,se of animal existence. For it is obvious 
that the continuance in being of even a gnat depends upon such 
cosmic influences as sole.r heat, atmospheric pressure, food, 
and the like, without which it would at once perish. Though 
it is less evident at first, it becomes clear upon a little 
consideration that no created being can continue in existence 
without the present actual existence of God. Accordingly, st. 
Thomas concludes, "every cree,ture maybe compared to God as the 
air is to the sun which enlightens it. fI For as "the ,cdr does 
24 Ibid. 
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not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun 
ceases to act upon it, II so the creature "would at once·'cease 
and all nature would collapse," if the causal power of God 
were to be withdrawn. 25 Since then "God not only gave 
existence to things when they first began to exist, but also 
.;, 
causes existence in them as long 8,S they exist," 26 8,nd, 
since by His sustaining Power, He conserves them in being at 
every moment lest they lapse back inti the nothingness from 
which they came, He can scarcely be said to be unconcerned 
as to the workings of the world. 
Is God, however, a "frigid" being, a "tyrant" with whom 
creation is "an inferior avocation," as Whitehead asserts? 
A brief consideration of the reason why the world came into 
being should preserve one from entertaining any such faulty 
notion. God did not create the universe in order to add to 
His perfection, or to increase His happiness. He is the ~ 
fullness of being, of perfection, of happiness. He is in no 
way greater or happier for having brought the world into 
existence. God has given being to creatures out of pure 
benevolence, - that others might share the good which He pos-
sesses. Unlike creatures 
He does not act on account of His goodness 
as if He were seeking to acquire goodness 
which He did not possess; but rather as 
seeking to communicate what He already pos-
sessed. Because God acts, not out of desire 
of the end, but out of love of it. 27 
----------------25 Ibid. 
26 contrA Gentiles, III p. 67. 
27 De Potentia" q. 3 a. 15 ad 14 um. 
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Emphasizing the truth that it is not for utility that God has 
created, St. Thomas also states: 
It does not belong to the First Agent . • • 
to act for the acquisition of some end, He 
intends only to communiQate His perfection, 
which is His goodness.2~ Therefore, He 
alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, 
because He does not act for His own profit, 
but only for His goodness. 29 
St. Thoma.s explains that just as natural things have a 
natural inclination to diffuse their tood among others, - the 
plant to diffuse itself in a flower, the animal to diffuse 
itself in its kind, - so, much more does it befit the Divine 
Goodness from Whom all perfection is derived, to communicate 
His Good to others. He states: 
• • • natural things have a na,tur8.1 inclina-
tion not only towards their own proper good, 
to acquire it if not possessed, and, if pos-
sessed, to rest therein; but also to spread 
abroad their own good amongst others, so far 
as possible. Hence we see that every agent, 
insofar as it is perfect and in act, produces 
its like. It pertains, therefore, to the 
nature of the will to communicate as far as 
possible to others the good possessed; and 
especially does this pertain to the divine' 
will, from which all perfection is derived in 
some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural 
things insofar as they are perfect, communi-
cate their good to others, much more does it 
B_ppertain to the divine will to communica,te 
by likeness its own good to others, Ets·much 
as i~ possible. 30 
God, then, crea,ted beings, not because He had any need of them, 
nor 
28 
29 
30 
because He could derive any utility 
Summa Theolo~ice, I q. 44.a.4. 
Ibid., I q. 4.a.4 .. ad 1 un. 
Ibid., I q. 19.a.2. 
from them, but solely 
to communicate His Goodness. 
Such divine altruism is incredible to Professor Harts-
horne who is of the opinion that: 
Only a mere machine that blindly passed 
out benefits could conform to the notion 
of benevolence that hpd nothing to ga,in 
from its service to others7 31 
There is another thought which· carries with it the refu-
tation of the false notion that a transcendent God "stood in 
... 
the same rela.tion to the whole Wor,ld a,s ea.rly Egyptian or 
Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject pOpula,tions. tI It 
is that God transcendent and perfect loves all creatures with 
an eternal love. Although creatures have not existed from 
eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him 
from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper 
natures; and for that reason has loved them. 32 Moreover, 
God does not love as we love. We love beings because they B.re 
.... 
lovable, - their goodness arouses love in us. But God does 
not love creatures because they are lovable; they are lovable 
because He loves them. 
God loves everything tha,t exists. Yet not 
as we love. Because since our will is not 
the cause of the goodness of things, but is 
moved by it as by its object, our love, 
whereby we will good to anything, is not the 
cause of its goodness; but conversely, its 
goodness, whether real or imaginW'y, calls 33 
forth our love. 
~--------------31 Charles Hart shorne, "Is WIli tehea.d I s God the God of 
Religion," Ethics, Vol. LIII No.3 (1934) p. 225. 
32 st. Thoma,s Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 20 a. 2. 
33 Ibid., I q.20 a.2 2,d 2. 
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A complete enalysis of A.ll the titles by which the 
. .' 
world and God 2re intima,tely related in Thomistic philosophy 
would carry us far beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
the thoughts we heve sketched: that God loved the world from 
all eternity, that because of His loXe of. it He brought it 
into being, and that He conserves it in being at every moment 
lest it fall back into nothingness, - 1'3.11 prove that the God 
of St. Thoma.s is not the extreme whict. lies opposl te to the 
position which regards God as completely identified with the 
world. On the contrary; it is the virtuous meEtn which lies 
between the two extremes of Pantheism and De.ism. 
So much foI' Whitehead's objections a.gainst the tra,ditiona1 
conception of God as rests,ted by Hp.rtshorne. Two further ab-
jections raised by WhiteheAd, but nat explicitly mentioned 
( 
by HaI'tsharne, must nat be cansidered: first that the attri-
butes of the Christian Gad repI'esent mere abstr.!:'ctians simi-
lar to. the abstI'actians in PIRto's realm af forms; and 
secondly, that they are based upan an erraneaus theary af 
science and cansequently must be Abandaned. 
As . regards the first ob jection, Whitehead, as we ha,ve 
.... 
seen" canfuses abstractian with omission ar absence. He views 
the notions of self-subsistent being, immutable being, infi-
ni te being, transcendent being, a,nd the like, as mere abstrp.c-
tians" because of such pre-suppasi tians .g,S: 
34 
There i's no. entity, not even God, "which 
nothing but itself in order to exist." 
Religion in the Ma.kiI,!g, p. 107. 
requires 
34 
No actuality is a static fact • . • 
"existence in g,ny of its forms 
cannot be abstra,cted from process." 35 
All realization is finite. 36 
No entity can be considered in 
abstraction from the Universe. 37 
.' 
But all of these assumptions 8,re erroneous as we shall show 
in the next chapter. 
Tha,t it is a mistake to attribut4e to St. Thomas the 
28 
Platonic position is clear from the consideration that Plato's 
"universals," - "Beauty, If the "Good, II and the like, - are 
essences, they are not existences. Essence, with Plato, is 
higher tha,n existence. But unless there be something whose 
essence is its existence, essence can be understood without 
anything being known of its existence. Hence Plato's Ideas 
of the Good, Beauty, and the One may not exist in the n8,tural 
order. St. Thome,s' s Good, "Pure Act, ft however, is an Exis- .... 
tence, "He is a Pure Act of Existing. 1I 38 That St. Thomas's 
conclusions about God really apply to 8,n actual entity is 
obvious once the value of the idea is properly understood. 
The idea revea,ls directly reality, and only indirectly the 
mental representetion of it. Its purpose is primarily to ma,ke 
known the object, and only secondarily to be known itself. It 
is the means N which the intellect knows, and not that which 
it knows. "The stone is that which is understood [i.e. known] 
35 Adventures of Idees, p. 354. 
36 Ibid., p. 330. 
37 Mathematics and the Good, p. 672 
38 E. Gilson, God 8,nd PhilosophX. 
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and not the likeness (i.e. the idea] of the stone; except by 
.' a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise the ob-
ject s of science [i. e. knowledge] ,,,ould not be things, but 
only intelligible species [i.e. ideas] " 39 
Ideas, then, have a reol vl?_lue bectmse they make known 
.. , 
things. In like menner judgments which are composed of ideFl.s, 
are judgments of reAlity. Further, ree,soning which is me.de 
up of judgments, drmTs conclusions p,btut reAlity. When the 
mathematicie.n ree,sons a.bout quantity, his conclusions gpply 
to quantity in the ree.l order. 1fuen a physicist ree.sons about 
motion, his conclusions B.pply to motion ~tS it is. When 8. 
philosopher reasons about God, his conclusions apply to 8, real 
Being, and not to a mere subjective idea or abstraction 
(unless, his judgments are fe,lse or his reasoning processes 
8,re incorrect). 
..... This brings us to the final objection that the traditional 
theistic arguments are based upon ancient and medieval science 
and consequently must be abandoned. Contrary to Whitehead's 
assumption, Thomistic theodicy is not built upon any system of 
natural science. Indeed, st. Thomas teaches the,t it is an 
error to apply the principles and methods of a lower science 
to a higher science. liThe principles of mathematics," he de-
clares, by way of example, "are applicable to physics, but the 
converse is not true, for physics depends upon mathematics, 
39 St. Thomas .~.quinas, Summe. Theologica, I q.76 a.2 ad 4. 
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but not vice versa." 40 Now philosophy, which is th~. science 
which studies being, not under any particular aspect, but 
being as being, is above all other sciences and, therefore, 
wholly independent of them. Consequently, just as it is 
ridiculous to suppo"se that the multiplication table must be 
altered with each new advance in physics, so it is equally 
absurd to believe that our concept of God must be recast with 
.. 
every new advance in mathematics, or physics, or biology. On 
the contrary, it is Whitehead's concept which is admittedly 
grounded upon the new science that will pass away when the 
present theories become antiquated. 
40 De Trinitate Boetii, q. 5 a. 3 ad 5. 
CHAPTER II 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HARTSHORNE'S ANALYSIS 
OF WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT 
.. ., . . Professor Hertshorne's plain descrlptlon of Whitehead's 
God is, 'as ·we have seen, 1 substantially correct. The valid-
ity of his conclusion that this God is a real God must now 
... 
be examined. 
According to the Chicago professor "the entire complexity 
of ultimate contraries" 2 must be applied to God. Let us 
consider the most fundamental of these sets of opposites and 
see if it is reasonable to apply them to the Supreme Being. 
Thus, let us examine if: 
And if: 
lilt is as true to say that God creates the 
World, as that the World creates God. 1t 
"It is e,s true to say that God is permanent 
and the World fluent, as that the World is 3 
permanent and God is fluent." 
As regards the first contention, Dr. Hartshorne, like 
Whitehead, is convined that, "No God is conceivable who would 
not depend for part of his value upon the a.ction of crea-
tures." 4 And when we investigate concerning what "part of 
his value" it is for which a God is thus dependent we find 
it is a very importl:mt part indeed. For it is in his "concrete 
1 See above, Part I, Ch. II. 
2 Ope cit., p. 523. 
3 'Ibid., p. 522; also Whitehead, Process and Reality p. 528. 
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degree," the.t is, in his real, a.ctual being, that he ~epends 
upon them. "All reF"lization is social," we are told, " and 
in its concrete degree dependent upon other being. "5 In 
Dr. Hartshorne1s view, God apart from the universe possesses 
only "conceptual" or "abstre.ct re,~lli~ation of value," a.s 
opposed to real or IIconcrete dimension of value." 6 
But if this is so, then God apart from the universe pos-
.. 
sesses no real being. For to maintain on this supposition, 
that God apart from the universe is anything real, it would 
be necessary to identify the conceptual with the real. But 
these two orders are totally distinct - one belongs to the 
order of objective existence, the other to the order of 
thought. To identify them is to identify the diverse. But 
if God possesses no ree.l being apart from the universe he is 
not God but the universe. 
However, Dr. Hartshorne protests that the God of Whitehea 
is not completely identified with the world. He is not the Go 
of Pantheism. Nevertheless, if God is "the synthesis of the 
total universe," if he 1s lithe all-inclusive actual entity," 
if creatures "furnish parts of God," if the only difference 
which separates God and creatures is one of IIvalue ," if there 
is no ontologica.l separateness between the one and the other, 
then there is no reason for God being distinct from the world. 
But to make God and the world ontologically one, is to 
5 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas,p. 215. 
6 See above, pp. 8-9. 
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make the mover identica.l with the moving thing, under the 
.' 
same formal relation, and to make the simple identical with 
the composite, the necessary with the contingent, the cause 
with the effect, in a word, it is to deny the first principles 
of reason. 
St. Thomas's God, in contrAst with this, is "outside the 
order of the whole creation." For He is different in nature 
from all created things. .. In crea.tures essence is always dis-
tinct from existence, where~s in God essence and existence 
are identical. For: 
Existence is that which makes every form or 
nature actual; for goodness or humanity is 
only spoken of a,s actual when it is spoken of 
as existing. It is necessecry, therefore, that 
existence should stand to essence, which is 
distinct from it, in the same relation a,s 
actus,li ty to potentiality. Therefore, since 
in God there is no potentiality,. it follows 
ths,t in Him essence does not differ from 
existence. Therefore His essence is His 
existence. 7 
God, then, is His being, His goodness, His perfections, where-
as creatures merely have their being, their perfections. God 
is being itself, creatures are beings merely by participation. 
Moreover, all the being and goodness which creatures possess 
they hold from God, Who called them forth from nothingness. 
Without Him they would have only non-bei~g. Now there can be 
no identification of the diverse. Since the being of God a,nd 
the being of creatures belong to wholly different orders, 
7 St. Thomas AqUinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 3 8.. 4. 
quoted in Scholastic Metaphysics II, by J.F.McCormick,p.100. 
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creatures ca.nnot "furnish parts of God," or fuse with Him or 
.' be I?dded to or subtracted from Him. The difficulty of con-
ceiving how creatures can be derived from God without forming 
pa,rt of Him arises from the failure, alrel?dy mentioned,8 to 
conceive "being" as analogous. 
St. Thomas also proves negatively that God is distinct 
fr om the world. .(';"s if wri t ing f or our own time s, he asks,' 
"Whether God enters into the composition of other things?" 
He then proves that it is impossible for God to be united to 
the universe either as the soul of the world, p,s the formal 
principle of things, or as the material principle of things. 
For God is the first efficient Cause, a.nd the efficient cause 
cannot be identical either with the form or with the matter of 
its effect. It "is not identical numerically with the form of 
the thing caused, but only specifically;1t and it is neither 
numerically nor specifically identical with the matter of the'" 
thing caused. 9 Consequently, just as a statue c.a,n never be 
identical with the scupltor, pgrticipated being can never be 
identical with neces$ary being. To view God as "the personal-
ity of the cosmic body," as the "mind" or soul of the universe, 
is to conceive God as both maker and made - A.S the essential 
pa,rt of a compound which He Himself has created, - which is , 
absurd. 
This brings us to the second contention: that God is "in 
proce~s" with the evolving world. "All realization," 've are 
8 See above pp. 16-17. 
9 Summa Theolo ica, I q. 3 a. 8. 
35 
told, "involves implication in the creative advance." 10 
• 
"A process is inherent in God's nature whereby His infinity 
is acquiring realization." 11 But God cannot be "in process" 
nor implicated in "the creative advance." For, as St. Thomas 
proves, flWhatever is in movement is moved by another." Move-
ment or "process" is necessarily a transition from potency 
to act. (By potency is meant passive capability. It is "the 
... 
principle through which anything is capa,ble of being moved or 
. acted upon by another. n12 Act is the realization of potenc~)1 
But: 
Nothing can be moved from potentiality to 
actuality, except by some being already in 
a state of actuality. But it is not possible 
that the same thing should be at once actual 
and potential in the same respect, but only 
in different respects. For what is actually 
hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; 
but it is simultaneously potentially cold. 
It is therefore impossible that in the same 
respect and in the same way a thing should 
be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should 
move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion 
must be put in motion by another. If that by 
which it is put in motion be itself put in 
motion, then this also must needs be put in 
motion by another, and that by another again. 
But this ca,nnot go on to infinity, because 
then there would be no first mover, and, con-
sequently no other mover;seeing that the sub-
sequent movers move only inasmuch as they a.re 
put in motion by the first mover; as the staff 
moves only because it is put in motion by the 
hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at 
a first mover, put in motion by no other, and 
this everyone understands to be God. 13 
10 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 200. 
11 Ibid., Adventures of Ideas, p. 356. 
12 Comm. Met. V., Lect. 14. 
13 Summa Theologica, I q. 2 a,.3. 
.. 
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If a thing, then, has not a particular form of being, it 
4' 
cannot be the source from which it receives the process by 
which it attains that new form. "No one can give (either to 
himself or another) what he does not possess." Now a con-
tinuous IIprocess" involves a continuous transition from 
.. "7 
potency to act, -- a continuous production of a new effect. 
But the sufficient reason of the new effect can only be the 
continuous operation of a.,n efficient ~ause. The sufficient 
reason of IIprocess ll can only be a being in act. Otherwise 
we should have to say that being comes from nothingness, the 
gree,ter comes from the less, what has not being has being, 
which is absurd. 
We note that this absurdity is not beyond the credulity 
of contemporary philosophers. Professor Hartshorne cle8~rly 
asserts, lithe cause is never 'equal to the effect,' the latter 
always being the richer; the former, seen retrospectively, • 
being a reduction to an abstract or incomplete version of 
itself.1f 
Whitehead's God, then, who is Ifin process, II demands e, 
mover. To say that he derives his added perfections from 
creatures does not'help the situation. For whence do crea-
tures derive them? According to this metaphysics, creatures 
derivet.hem from God and God derives them from creatures. 
IfNei ther God nor the World reaches stl1,tic completion. Both 
are in the grip • • • of the cree.,ti ve advance into novelty. 
Either of them, God and the World, is the instrument of 
37 
,novelty for the other." 15 "God is enriched by the world" •. 
. ' 
he passes back to the world to share this enhancement." Ppu-
pers need be penniless no longer on this re8soning. Let them 
merely get together and enrich each other. 
Professor Whitehead's attempt tq eV8de this difficulty 
.... 
by supposing that God is acted upon, or moved in one aspect, 
but in a different aspect of his being, he is the agent, is 
untenable. For there can be no vicio.s circle in the same 
order of caus8.1i ty. Otherwise the cause would and would not 
presuppose its effect. If the light in the air depends upon 
the transmission of light from the sun, sol,g,r light cannot 
depend. upon light in the air. If knowledge in the pupil de-
pends upon the teacher, the pupil is not the efficient cause 
of this knowledge in the teacher. 16 
In contrast with this theory of a "fluent'" God, who grows, 
improves cmd enriches himself, and who, therefore, necessaril.: 
presupposes an f.'ctuality superior to himself who IlctU8.l1y 
possesses the improvement gnd enrichment for which this one 
is as yet only in potency, is the Thomistic doctrine of an 
uncha,ngeable, infinitely perfect actuality, "Pure Act, II "He 
Who IS," flSubsistent Being," lithe plenitude of all perfection 
of all being, tI and the 8dequate source of ,nIl becoming or 
"nrocess" in the universe . 
.I: 
We have already seen thA,t the world requires a pl'>ime mover 
(pp. 35-36 ); the,t the prime mover must be "Pure Act" is clear 
15 Process B,nd Reeli ty, p. 529. (Italics not in the orlginrl). 
16 Contra Gentiles, Bk I C. XIII. 
from the consideration thrt potentiality presupposes Actuality . 
.. 
But God is the First CRuse. He must therefore be in no way 
potentiAl. As St. Thomas asserts: 
The first being must of necessity be in 
pct, and in no wPy in potentiality. For 
plthough in any single thing thpt passes 
from potentiality to actuplity, the 
potentiality is prior in time to the 
," ctuB.li ty, nevertheles s pbsolutely speak-
ing, actuality is prior to potentiality; 
for whatever is in potentip\ity CR.n be 
reduced into Rctuality only by some aeing 
in actuality. Now it has already been 
proved that God is the First Being. It is 
therefore impossible th,!:l.t in God there 
should be any potentiality. 17 
Since God is Pure Act, He must plso be most perfect, "for 
a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of pctuplity, 
because we call th/?,t perfect which lp.cks nothing of the mode 
of its perfection." 18 Pure Act, then, is pure perfection -
unlimited or infinite reelty.19 
The.t God is Altogether immutable follows from the fpet 
that He is infinitely perfect. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Everything which is moved p.cquires some-
thing by its movement, ~nd Bttains to 
wh8t it had not ettained previously. But 
since God is infinite, comprehending in 
Himself all the plenitude of perfection 
of 8.11 being, He c2nnot acquire Anything 
new, nor extend Himself to IOmything 
whereto He wes not extended previously. 
Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. 
The real God, then, cl?nnot receive perfection. 
S~a ~heolo~ica, I q. 3 a.l. 
Ibld., I q. . a. 1. 
Ibid., I q. 7 a. 1. 
Ib id., I q. 9 8. 1. 
20 
He hps of 
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Himself, from all eternity, ~tll that He C[l,n hl,we. Nei~her 'can 
He be flin process," in the course of which the more perfect 
is always produced by the less perfect, for such is a patent 
absurdity. On the contrary, the real God, incompl?,rable per-
fect, abides eternally unchanged. 
.. 
CONCLUSION 
EXAMINATION OF HP~TSHORNE'S COMPP~ISON AND 
EVALUATION OF HIS CONCLUSION 
.' 
We have seen that the attributes '''''of St. Thom~,s' s God 
are very different from Dr. Hp"rtshorne' s notion of them. We 
have also seen that the substitute attributes postul~.lted by 
.. ' 
Whi tehea,d cannot be applied to a supreme being. The conclu-
sion that the God of Whitehead is more the supreme being than 
is the God of st. Thomas, mp,y now be evaluated. 
According to Professor Hartshorne: 
It is the unrivalled excellence of the 
activity-and-passivity, the unity-and-
complexitY:-the being-and-becoming~es 
the joy-and-suffering, of God which 
elevates him above e,ll others, ,g,ctue,l 
or conceivable. 1 
The perfect God "requires his union with the World." He'" 
is "the creator-with-the-creatures." But, as we have already 
proved,2 none of these sets of "contraries" can be epplied to 
God. To sum up briefly: God cannot be both "being-and-becom-
ing," or "activity-and-passivity," for that which is in any 
e,spect "becoming" or passive, demp,nds a ca,use. "Becoming, 
receptivity," or "process" necessarily involves the emergence 
of 8,n additiona,l element, and the ultimate source of this ad-
dition must be a higher cause. To affirm the contrary is to 
assert that being comes from nothing, which is absurd. Since, 
1 QQ. Cit., p. 523. 
2 . see Pa,rt II, Che,pter II. 
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then, Whitehead's God is "becoming," "fluent," passive or 
.' 
moving, he demands ~ Prime Mover. 
God cannot be both lithe unity-and-complexitylt (as 11 
human being is an individual whole constituted by many pa,rts) 
becEmse whatever is composite needs 2 .. '7 cause. "Because every 
composite is posterior to its component parts, and is depen-
dent upon them." 3 Whitehead's composite God, then, pre-
• supposes the existence of a Being, Absolutely Simple, who 
ca,uses his diverse element s to unite. 
Finally, God cannot "require his union with the World." 
Nor can "the relationships of God to the World • lie beyond 
the accidents of his will, a,nd • be founded -upon the 
necessities of the nature of God and the nature of the World. II 4 
For e, being who exists and acts merely from the necessity of 
his nature presupposes a Being Who gave him theft nature and 
imposed on him the law 8.ccording to which he should act. 
The God of Process and Reality, then, who depends upon 
other actualities for his complete realize~tion, who is not in 
all respects infinite, but who is gradually acquiring rep,liza-
tion by "process," is in reality rio God at all. 
Such a being, even if it were a god, would necessarily be 
inferior to the God of St. Thomas. For "process" or "becoming" 
is the ste,te of one who is in potency to a perfection which is 
not yet possessed. "Everything which moves acquires something 
3 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q.3 e~. 7. 
4 Whitehead,Adventures of Ideas, p. 215. 
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- by its movement, and att.9>ins to wha.t it had not attained pre-
viously. II 5 But the God of st. Thoma.s possesses trin Himself 
.9,11 the plenitude of perfection of all being. He cannot e,c-
quire anything new." Since, then, activity is more than 
passivity, ~tnd being is more than be<!oming, and possession is 
more' than acquiring, the God who is Pure }'\.ct, Pure Being, who 
is in full possession of Perfection, is more the supreme being 
• 
th!3-n is the one who is !lin process" of atta,ining it. 
5 St. Thomas Aquine.s, Summa Theologica, I q. 9 a.l. 
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